Deception plays a critical role in the financial industry, online markets, national defense, and countless other important areas. Understanding and harnessing deception, especially in cyberspace, is both crucial and difficult. Recent efforts have studied deception through the lens of game theory, which enables studying the roles of incentives and rationality, and making verifiable predictions. In this paper, we go beyond equilibrium analysis and use a mechanism design perspective in order to engineer solutions to realistic problems. Specifically, we study how the use of honeypots for network defense changes when adversaries gain the ability to detect evidence of honeypots. We analyze two game models: cheap-talk games and an augmented version of those games which we call cheap-talk games with evidence. Using those models, we show how network defenders can design exogenous factors such as the number of honeypots in a system and the cost at which compromised network computers in order to respond to the advent of honeypot-detecting technology and continue to achieve desired levels of utility. Our first contribution is the model that we develop for evidence-based signaling games, and the analysis of how this model includes models of traditional signaling games and complete information games as special cases. The other contributions include a numerical demonstration showing that deception detection causes pure-strategy equilibria to fail to be supported under certain conditions, and a surprising result that the development by the receiver of the ability to detect deception could actually increase the utility of a possibly-deceptive sender. These results have concrete implications for network defense through honeypot deployment. But they are also general enough to apply to the large and critical body of strategic interactions that involve deception.
Introduction
Deception has always garnered attention in popular culture, from the deception that planted a seed of anguish in Shakespeare's Macbeth to the deception that drew viewers to the more contemporary television series Lie to Me. Our human experience seems to be permeated by deception, which may even be engrained into human beings via evolutionary factors [1, 2] . Yet humans are famously bad at detecting deception [3, 4] . An impressive body of research aims to improve these rates, especially in interpersonal situations. Many investigations involve leading subjects to experience an event or recall a piece of information and then asking them to lie about it [5, 3, 6] . Researchers have shown that some techniques can aid in detecting lies -such as asking a suspect to recall events in reverse order [3] , asking her to maintain eye contact [6] , asking unexpected questions or strategically using evidence [7] . Increasing interaction and making use of intelligent questioning [7] as a way to improve our deception detection abilities. Clearly, detecting interpersonal deception is still an active area of research.
While understanding interpersonal deception is difficult, studying deception in cyberspace has its set of unique challenges. In cyberspace, information can lack permanence, typical cues to deception found in physical space can be missing, and it can be difficult to imputing responsibility [8] . Consider, for example, the problem of identifying deceptive opinion spam in online markets. Deceptive opinion spam consists of comments made about products or services by actors posing as customers, when they are actually representing the interests of the company concerned or its competitors. The research challenge is to separate comments made by genuine customers from those made by self-interested actors posing as customers. This is difficult for humans to do unaided; two out of three human judges in [9] failed to perform significantly better than at chance. To solve this problem, the authors of [9] make use of approaches including a tool called the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count, an approach based on the frequency distribution of part of speech tags, and third approach which uses a classification based on n-grams. This highlights the importance of an interdisciplinary approach to studying deception, especially in cyberspace.
Although an interdisciplinary approach to studying deception offers important insights, the challenge remains of putting it to work in a quantitative framework. In behavioral deception experiments, for instance, the incentives to lie are also often poorly controlled, in the sense that subjects may simply be instructed to lie or to tell the truth [10] . This prohibits a natural setting in which subjects could make free choices. These studies also cannot make precise mathematical predictions about the effect of deception or deception-detecting techniques [10] . Understanding deception in a quantitative framework could help to give results rigor and predictability.
To achieve this rigor and predictability, we analyze deception through the framework of game theory. This framework allows making quantitative, verifiable predictions, and enables the study of situations involving free choice (the option to deceive or not to deceive) and well-defined incentives [10] . Specifi- Figure 1 .1: A general framework for mechanism design. Manipulating the environment in which deception takes place in a signaling game could include adding additional blocks such as feedback, in addition to manipulating exogenous parameters of the game.
cally, the area of incomplete information games allows modeling the information asymmetry that forms part and parcel of deception. In a signaling game, a receiver observes a piece of private information and communicates a message to a receiver, who chooses an action. The receiver's best action depends on his belief about the private information of the sender. But the sender may use strategies in which he conveys or does not convey this private information. It is easy to make connections between the signaling game terminology of pooling, separating, and partially-separating equilibria and deceptive, truthful, and partially-truthful behavior. Thus, game theory provides a suitable framework for studying deception.
Beyond analyzing equilibria, we also want to design solutions that control the environment in which deception takes place. This calls for the reverse game theory perspective of mechanism design. In mechanism design, exogenous factors are manipulated in order to design the outcome of a game. In signaling games, these solutions might seek to obtain target utilities or obtain a desired level of information communication. If the deceiver in the signaling game has the role of an adversary -for problems in security or privacy, for example -a defender often wants to design methods to limit the amount of deception. But defenders may also use deception to their advantage. In this case, it is the adversary who may try to implement mechanisms to mitigate the effects of the deception. A more general mechanism design perspective for signaling games could consider other ways of manipulating the environment, such as feedback and observation.
In this paper, we study deception in two different frameworks. The first framework is a typical game of costless communication between a sender and receiver known as cheap-talk. In the second framework, we add the element of deception detection, forming a game of cheap-talk with evidence. This latter model includes a move by nature after the action of the sender, which yields evidence for deception with some probability. In order provide a concrete example, we consider a specific example of the use of deception for defense, and the employment of antideceptive techniques by an attacker. In this scenario, a defender uses honeypots disguised as normal systems to protect a network, and an adversary implements a method of detecting the honeypots in order to strike back against this deception. We give an example of how an adversary might obtain evidence for deception through a timing classification known as fuzzy benchmarking. Finally, we obtain results on how network defenders will need to bolster their capabilities in order to maintain the same results in the face of honeypot detection. This mechanism design approach reverses the mappings from adversary power to evidence detection and evidence detection to game outcome. Although we apply it to a specific research problem, our approach is quite general and can be used in deceptive interactions in both interpersonal deception and deception in cyber security in which an actor employs some method of attempting to detect deception. Our main contributions include 1) developing a model for signaling games with deception detection, and analyzing how this model includes models of traditional signaling games and complete information games as special cases, 2) demonstrating that the ability to detect deception causes pure strategy equilibria to disappear under certain conditions, and 3) showing that deception detection by an adversary could actually increase the utility obtained by a network defender. These results have specific implications for network defense through honeypot deployment, but can be applied to a large class of strategic interactions involving deception in both physical and cyberspace.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews cheap-talk signaling games and the solution concept of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
We use this framework to analyze the honeypot scenario in section 3. Section 4 adds the element of evidence of deception to the signaling game. We analyze the honeypot scenario in this new framework in section 5. In section 6, we analyze the ways in which a network defender needs to change his defense design approach to respond to the advent of honeypot detection -i.e. how the signaling game scenario changes once a receiver has the ability to detect deception. We review related work in section 7, and conclude the paper in section 8.
Cheap-Talk Signaling Games
In this section, we review the concept of signaling games, a class of two-player, dynamic, incomplete information games. The information asymmetry and dynamic nature of these games captures the essence of deception, and the notion of separating, pooling, or partially-separating equilibria can be related to truthful, deceptive, or partially-truthful behavior. 
Game Model
Our model is consists of a signaling game in which the types, messages, and actions are taken from discrete sets with two options. Let us call this twoplayer, incomplete information game G. In this game, a sender, S, observes a type m ∈ M = {0, 1} drawn with probabilities p (0), and p (1). He then sends a message, n (m) ∈ N = {0, 1} to the receiver, R. After observing the message (but not the type), R plays an action y (m) ∈ Y = {0, 1} . The flow of information between sender and receiver is depicted in 2.1. Let u S (y, m) and u R (y, m) be the utility obtained by S and R, respectively, when the type is m and the receiver plays action y. Notice that the utilities are not directly dependent on the message, n; hence the description of this model as a "cheaptalk" game.
The sender's strategy consists of playing messages n, after observing a type m, with probability σ S (n | m).The receiver's strategy consists of playing actions y, after observing a message n, with probability σ R (y | n). Denote the sets of all such strategies as Γ S , and Γ R . Define expected utilities for the sender and receiver as U S : Γ S ×Γ R → R and U R : Γ S ×Γ R → R, such that U S (σ S , σ R ) and U R (σ S , σ R ) are the expected utilities for the sender and receiver, respectively, when the sender and receiver play according to the strategy profile (σ S , σ R ).
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
We now review the concept of Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the natural extension of subgame perfection to games of incomplete information.
A Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (see [11] ) of signaling game G is a strategy profile (σ S , σ R ) and posterior beliefs µ R (m | n) of the receiver about the sender such that ∀m ∈ M, σ S ∈ arg max
Eq. 2.1 requires S to maximize his expected utility for the strategy played by R for all types m. The second equation requires R to maximize his expected utility for the strategy played by S and his belief's about the type m given the message n sent by S. Finally, Eq. 2.3 requires the beliefs of R about the type to be consistent with the strategy played by S, using Bayes' Law to update his prior belief according to S's strategy.
Analysis of Deceptive Conflict Using CheapTalk Signaling Games
In this section, we describe an example of deception in cyber security using signaling games without evidence. These type of models have been used, for instance, in [12] . We give results here primarily in order to show how the results change after we add the factor of evidence emission in Section 5. Consider a game G honey , in which a defender uses honeypots to protect a network of computers. We use a game model and parameters from [12] , with some adaptations. In this game, the ratio of normal systems to honeypots is considered fixed. Based on this ratio, nature assigns a type -normal system or honeypot -to each system in the network. The sender is the network defender, who can choose to reveal the type of each system or disguise the systems. He can both disguise honeypots as normal systems and disguise normal systems as honeypots. The message is thus the network defender's portrayal of the system. The receiver in this game is the attacker, who observes the defender's portrayal of the system but not the actual type of the system. He chooses an action: attack or withdraw.
In the model description in [12] , the attacker also has an option to condition his attack on testing the system. We omit this option in our analysis in this section, because we will model testing the system in our signaling game with evidence emission in Section 5. First, we model G honey with the typicallyconsidered sender receiver game without evidence. Table 1 gives the parameters of G honey , and the extensive form of G honey is given in Fig. 3.1 . We have used the game theory software Gambit [13] for this illustration, as well as for simulating the results of games later in the paper.
In order to characterize the equilibria of G honey , define a constants CB R m , CB S m , m ∈ {0, 1} that we can call relative benefits, such that CB R 0 gives the relative benefit to R for playing attack (y = 1) compared to playing withdraw (y = 0) when the system is a normal system (m = 0), and CB R 1 gives the relative benefit to R for playing withdraw (y = 0) compared to playing attack (y = 1) when the system is a honeypot (m = 1). These constants are defined by 3.1 and 3.2.
We now find the pure-strategy separating and pooling equilibria of G honey .
Theorem 1. The equilibria of G honey differ in form in three parameter regions: Type of system (0: normal system; 1: honeypot) n ∈ {0, 1}
Defender's description of system (0: normal system; 1: honeypot) y ∈ {0, 1} Action of attacker (0: withdraw; 1:
Prior probability of type m σ S (n | m)
Sender's mixed strategy probability of describing as n a type m σ R (y | n)
Receiver's mixed strategy probability of action y given description n v o
Defender benefit of observing attack on honeypot v g Defender benefit of avoiding attack on normal system −c c Defender cost of normal system being comprimized v a Attacker benefit of comprimizing normal system −c a Attacker cost of attack on any type of system −c o Attacker additional cost of attacking honeypot Figure 3 .1: Extensive form of G honey , a game in which defender S chooses whether to disguise systems in a network of computers, and an attacker R attempts to gain from compromising normal systems but withdrawing from honeypots.
Attack-favorable:
Neither-favorable:
, meaning loosely that the expected benefit to the receiver for attacking normal systems is greater than the expected loss to the receiver for attacking honeypots. In defend-favorable,
, meaning that the expected loss for attacking honeypots is greater than the expected benefit from attacking normal systems. In neither-favorable,
; the expected loss for attacking honeypots is the same as the expected benefit from attacking normal systems. Note that exact equality in the game parameters is necessary for this equilibrium, so it is reasonable to assume that it seldom happens. Because of this, we do not analyze the neither-favorable region.
Separating Equilibria
In separating equilibria, the sender plays different pure strategies for each type that he observes. Thus, he completely reveals the truth. Intuition reveals that the attacker R in G honey wants to attack normal systems but withdraw from honeypots. The defender S wants the opposite: that the attacker attack honeypots and withdraw from normal systems. Thus, Theorem 2 should come as no surprise.
Theorem 2.
No separating equilibria exist in G honey .
Pooling Equilibria
In pooling equilibria, the sender plays the same strategies for each type that he observes. This is deceptive behavior because the sender's messages do not convey the type that he observes. The defender must then rely only on the prior beliefs about the distribution of types in order to formulate his best response. Theorem 3 gives the pooling equilibria of G honey in the attack-favorable region, and theorem 3 gives the pooling equilibria of G honey in the defend-favorable region.
Theorem 3. G honey supports the following pure strategy pooling equilibria in the attack-favorable parameter region:
with expected utilities given by
G honey supports the following pure strategy pooling equilibria in the defendfavorable parameter region:
In both cases, it is irrelevant whether the defender always sends 1 or always sends 0 (always describes systems as honeypots or always describes systems as normal systems); the effect is that attacker ignores the description. In the attack-favorable region, it is relatively more beneficial for the attacker to attack normal systems than to withdraw from honeypots, and the attacker chooses to always attack. In the defend-favorable region, it is relatively more beneficial for the attacker to withdraw from honeypots than to attack normal systems, and attacker chooses to always withdraw.
Discussion of G honey Equilibria
We will discuss these equilibria more when we compare them with the equilibria of the game with evidence emission. Still, we note two aspects of the equilibria here. The first is that the equilibrium utility is unique for each case, regardless of whether the sender pools at 1 or at 0. The second is what happens at the interface between the two parameter regions -i.e., at p (0) CB
Note from Eq. 3.1 and Eq. 3.2 that this interface is determined by the receiver utilities. In fact, if we plug in the value of p (0) that satisfies this equality, the expected utilities for the receiver taken from the attack-favorable and defend-favorable cases are equal. That is, the expected utility for the receiver, U R (σ S , σ R ), varies continuously with p (0). Since the interface is not at all determined by the sender's utilities, however,
. Indeed, as shown in Figure 3 .2, the sender's (network defender's) utility sharply improves if he transitions from having p (0) CB (1 − p (0)) CB R 1 , i.e. from having 40% honeypots to having 41% honeypots. This is an obvious mechanism design consideration. We will analyze this case further in the section on mechanism design.
Deception Detection in Cheap-Talk Signaling Games
In Section 3, we used a typical signaling game (as in [12] ) to model deception in cyberspace (in G honey ). In this section, we describe these games with the addition of load-based evidence emission. In a standard signaling game, the receiver's belief about the type is based only on the messages that the sender communicates and his prior belief. In many deceptive interactions, however, there is some probability that the sender gives off evidence of deceptive behavior. In this case, beliefs about the private information of a sender may be updated both by the direct communication of the sender and by the evidence of deception that he may give away with some probability. In this section, we model this two-part updating process.
Game Model
Let us denote by G evidence a signaling game with belief updating based on both sender's action and evidence that sender emits. This game consists of four steps, in which step 3 is new:
1. Sender, S, observes type, m ∈ M = {0, 1}.
2. Sender communicates a message, n ∈ N = {0, 1}, chosen according to a strategy σ S (n | m) ∈ Γ S = ∆N based on the type m that he observes.
3. Randomly, the sender emits evidence, e ∈ E = {0, 1} with probability λ (e | m, n). Signal e = 1 represents evidence of deception and e = 0 represents no evidence of deception.
4. Receiver R responds with an action, y ∈ Y = {0, 1}, chosen according to a strategy σ R (y | n, e) ∈ Γ R = ∆Y based on the message n that he receives and evidence e that he observes.
We can consider the evidence as another signal that is available to R -in addition to the message n. This signal comes from a detector, which generates evidence with a probability that is a function of m and n. The detector implements the function λ (e | m, n). We depict this view of the signaling game with evidence emission in Fig. 4 .1. We assume that λ (e | m, n) is common knowledge to both the sender and receiver. Since the evidence is emitted with some probability, we can model this as a move by a "chance" player, just as we can model the random selection of the type at the beginning of the game as a move by a chance player. The outcome of this chance move will be used by R together with his observation of S's action to infer his belief about the type m. We describe this belief updating in the next section.
Two-step Bayesian Updating
In this section we discuss the way in which the receiver in our strategic information transmission game with evidence emission computes beliefs. It is most intuitive to think of this as a two-step process, in which the receiver first updates his beliefs about the type based on the observed action of the sender, and updates his beliefs a second time based on the evidence emitted by the sender. Starting with the prior likelihoods of each type, he first updates his beliefs based on the message n that he receives, and then based on the evidence e that he observes. The following steps formulate the update process.
1. R observes player S's action. He computes belief µ (m | y) based on the prior likelihoods p (m) of each type and S's message n according to 2.3, which we rewrite here in 4.1.
2. After observing evidence, S computes a new belief based on the evidence emitted. The prior belief in this second step is given by µ (m | n) obtained in the first step. The forward conditional probability of emitting evidence e when the type is m and sender communicates message n is λ (e | m, n). Thus, the receiver updates his belief in this second step according to
We can, in fact, simplify this two-step updating rule. We give this in theorem 4 without proof; it can be found readily by rearranging terms in the law of total probability with three different events.
Theorem 4. The updating rule given by the two-step updating process in 4.1 and 4.2 gives an overall result of
and any distribution on M when m∈M λ (e |m, n) σ S (n |m) p (m) = 0.
Having formulated the belief updating rule, we now give the conditions for a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in our signaling game with evidence emission.
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in Signaling Game with Evidence Emission
The conditions for a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of our augmented game are the same as those for the original signaling game, except that the belief update includes the use of emitted evidence.
Definition 1.
A perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium with evidence of the game G evidence is a strategy profile (σ S , σ R ) and posterior beliefs µ(m | n, e), such that system given by 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 are simultaneously satisfied.
∀m ∈ M, σ S ∈ arg max
∀n ∈ N, ∀e ∈ E, σ R ∈ arg max
Again, the first two definitions require the sender and receiver to maximize their expected utilities. The third equation requires the receiver's belief about the type given the sender's action and the evidence emitted to be consistent with the mixed strategy played by the sender and the likelihoods with which evidence is emitted given the different types and possible actions.
The Effect of Deception Detection in CheapTalk Signaling Games
In section 4, we described our model of a signaling game with evidence emission.
In this section, we analyze the example of deception in the use of honeypots for network defense from section 3 in terms of our model with evidence emission.
Analysis of Deception with Evidence Emission in Cyberspace
Consider again our example of deception in cyberspace in which a defender protects a network of computer systems using honeypots. The defender has the ability to disguise normal systems as honeypots and honeypots as normal systems. In Section 3, we modeled this deception as if it were possible for the defender to disguise the systems without any evidence of his deception. In reality, attackers may try to detect honeypots. For example, send-safe.com's "Honeypot Hunter" [14] offers to check lists of HTTPS and SOCKS proxies and output text files of valid proxies, failed proxies, and honeypots. It performs a set of tests which include opening a false mail server on the local system to test the proxy connection, connecting to the proxy port, and attempting to proxy back to its false mail server [15] . Another approach to detecting honeypots is based on timing.
[16] used a process termed fuzzy benchmarking in order to classify systems as real machines or virtual machines, which could be used e.g., for honeypots. Using this process, the authors first run a set of instructions which yield different timing results on different host hardware architectures in order to learn more about the hardware of the host system. Then, they run a set of control modifying CPU instructions (read and write control register 3, which induces a translation lookaside buffer flush) that results in increased runtime on a virtual machine compared to a real machine. The degree to which the runtimes are different between the real and virtual machines depends on the number of sensitive instructions that they include in their loop. The goal is to run enough sensitive instructions to make the divergence in runtime -even in the presence of internet noise -large enough to reliably classify the system using a timing threshold. They do not identify limits to the number of sensitive instructions to run, but we can imagine, for example, that the honeypot detector might itself want to go undetected by the honeypot and so might want to limit the number of instructions.
Although they do not recount the statistical details, such an approach could result in a classification problem which can only be accomplished successfully with some probability. Consider a case in which a network defender configures a system such that basic tests suggest that the system is a normal system (n = 0), when it is actually a honeypot (m = 1). The classification problem in this case is portrayed by Fig. 5.1 . In this diagram t represents the execution time of the fuzzy benchmarking code. The curve f 0 (t) represents the probability density function for execution time for actual normal systems ((m, n) = (0, 0)), and the curve f 1 (t) represents the probability density function for execution time for virtual machines disguised as normal systems ((m, n) = (1, 0) ). The execution time t d represents a threshold time used to classify the system under test. Let AR i , i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} denote the area under regions 1 through 4. Recall that we have defined λ (e | m, n) to be the likelihood with which a system of type m represented as a system as type n gives off evidence for deception e (where e = 1 represents evidence for deception and e = 0 represents evidence for truthtelling). The virtual machine disguised as a normal system still may give off evidence for deception inadvertently, in this case in terms of the runtime of fuzzy benchmarking code. In this case, we would have
If the system under test were actually a normal system, then the same test could result in some likelihood of a false-positive result for deception. Then, we would have
We could draw a similar diagram to Fig. 5 .1 to depict the case in which an attacker is trying to differentiate a honeypot from a normal system configured to look like a honeypot. Let us assume that the likelihood with which a normal system masquerading as a honeypot can be successfully detected is equal to the likelihood with which a honeypot masquerading as a normal system can be successfully detected. Denote this probability as ∈ [0, 1]. Let δ ∈ [0, 1] be defined as the likelihood of falsely detecting deception (i.e. of thinking that what appears to be a normal system is actually a honeypot when it is in fact a normal system, or of thinking that what appears to be a honeypot is actually a normal system when it is in fact a honeypot). These probabilities are given by
In [16] , the authors tune the number of instructions for the CPU to run in order to sufficiently differentiate normal systems and honeypots. In our example of using timing to detect deception, and δ may relate to the number of instructions that the detector asks the CPU to run. In general, though, the factors which influence and δ could vary. We will find requirements on and δ necessary to achieve certain objectives for a network defender in Section 6. These requirements will be based on predicting the outcome of our signaling game with evidence for deception. In subsection 4.1, we suggested that the possibility of evidence emission in our game be modeled as a random event after the defender's move. We depict this in figure 5 .2, an extensive-form of the signaling game with evidence for deception that we call G evidence honey . (See [12] for a more detailed explanation of the meaning of the parameters.)
More powerful attackers will have relatively high and low δ compared to less powerful attackers 1 . In the extremes of and δ, we will see that the game degenerates into simpler types of games. In the next section, we describe how and δ affect the outcome of the game, and how this signaling game with evidence for deception relates to the typical signaling game without evidence from section 2. 
Description of Degenerate Cases in G evidence honey
Let us examine the way in which evidence emission affects G evidence honey by first examining degenerate cases. Because R updates his belief based on evidence emission in a Bayesian manner, we can see that any situation in which δ = will render the evidence useless. The condition δ = would arise from an attacker completely powerless to detect deception. This is indicated in Fig. 5.3 by the region game without evidence, which we may term R W eak to indicate a weak attacker. On the other extreme, we have the condition = 1, δ = 0, which indicates that the attacker can always detect deception and never registers false positives. Let us denote this region R Omnipotent to indicate an omnipotent attacker. R Omnipotent degenerates into a complete information game in which both S and R are able to observe the type m. Next, we have a condition in which the attacker's power is such that evidence guarantees deception (when δ = 0 but is not necessarily 1) and a condition in which the attacker's power is such that no evidence guarantees truth-telling (when = 1 but δ is not necessarily 0). We can term these two regions R Conservative and R Aggressive , because the attacker never has a false positive in R Conservative and never misses a sign for deception in R Aggressive . Finally, we have the region R Intermediate in which the attacker is powerful enough that he correctly detects deception with greater rate than he registers false positives, but does not lie in δ = 0 or = 1.
We list these attacker conditions in Table 2 . Let us examine the equilibria of G evidence honey in these different cases. No guarantees = 1 > δ = 0
Equilibria for R W eak
The equilibria for R W eak are given by our analysis of the game without evidence (G honey ) in Section 3. Recall that a separating equilibrium was not sustainable, while pooling equilibria did exist. Also, the equilibrium solutions fell into two different parameter regions. The expected utilities for the sender and receiver were the same for each of the equilibrium strategy profiles in this game.
Equilibria for R Omnipotent
For R Omnipotent , the attacker knows with certainty the type of system (normal or honeypot) that he is facing. If the evidence that he observes indicates that the system is a normal system, then he attacks. If the evidence indicates that the system is a honeypot, then he withdraws. The description which the defender gives the system is irrelevant.
Theorem 5. G evidence honey
, under adversary capabilities R Omnipotent supports the following pooling equilibria:
Similar to R W eak , in R Omnipotent the expected utilities for S and R are the same regardless of the equilibrium strategy chosen (although the equilibrium strategy profiles are not as interesting here because of the singular role of evidence).
Next, we analyze the equilibria in the non-degenerate cases, R Conservative , R Aggressive , and R Intermediate , by numerically solving for equilibria under selected parameter settings.
Equilibria for R Conservative , R Aggressive , and R Intermediate
In Section 3, we found analytical solutions for the equilibria of a signaling game in which the receiver does not have the capability to detect deception. In this section, we give results concerning signaling games in which the receiver does have the capability to detect deception, using illustrative examples rather than an analytical solution. To study the equilibria under the three non-degenerate cases, let us choose a set of parameters to set the attacker and defender utilities (Table 3 ). In this model (from [12] ), the defender gains from maintaining normal systems that are not attacked in the network, and also from observing attacks on honeypots. The defender incurs a loss if a normal system is attacked. The attacker, on the other hand, gains only from attacking a normal system; he incurs losses if he attacks a honeypot. Based on these parameters, we can find the equilibrium utilities at each terminal node of Fig. 5.2 . We study examples in the attacker capability regions of R Conservative , R Aggressive , and R Intermediate 2 . For each of these attacker capabilities, we look for equilibria in pure strategies under three different selected values for the percentage of normal systems (compared to honeypots) that make up a network. For the high case, we set the ratio of normal systems to total systems to be p (0) = 0.9. Denote this case normal-saturated. For the medium case, we set p (0) = 0.6. Denote this case non-saturated. Finally, label the low case, in which p (0) = 0.2, honeypot-saturated. For comparison, we also include the equilibria under the same game with no evidence emission (which corresponds to R W eak ), and the equilibria under the same game with evidence that has a true-positive rate of 1.0 and a false-positive rate of 0 (which corresponds to R Omnipotent ). In table 4, we list whether each parameter set yields pure strategy equilibria.
For adversary detection capabilities represented byR W eak , we have a stan-dard signaling game, and thus the well-known result that a (pooling) equilibrium always exists. In R Omnipotent , the deception detection is fool-proof, and thus the receiver knows the type with certainty. We are left with a complete information game. Essentially, the type merely determines which Stackelberg game the sender and receiver play. Because pure strategy equilibria always exist in Stackelberg games, R Omnipotent also always has pure-strategy equilibria. The rather unintuitive result comes from R Intermediate , R Conservative , and R Aggressive . In these ranges, the receiver's ability to detect deception falls somewhere between no capability (R W eak ) and perfect capability (R Omnipotent ). But while those regions exhibit pure-strategy equilibria, the intermediate regions may not. Specifically, they appear to fail to support pure-strategy equilibria when the ratio of honeypots within the network does not fall close to either 1 or 0. In Section 6 on mechanism design, we will see that this region plays an important role in the comparison of network defense -and deceptive interactions in general -with and without the technology for detecting deception.
Mechanism Design for Detecting or Leveraging Deception
In this section, we analyze the design considerations for a defender who is protecting a network of computers using honeypots. In order to do this, we choose a particular case study, and analyze how the network defender can best set parameters to achieve his goals. We also discuss the scenario from the point of view of the attacker. Specifically, we examine how the defender can set the exogenous properties of the interaction in 1) the case in which honeypots cannot be detected, and 2) the case in which the attacker has implemented a method for detecting honeypots. Then, we will compare how the advent of honeypot detection methods by attackers affects the defender's design considerations.
The honeypot example only serves as an illustration of a concept that can be applied to deception problems in general. The framework of the signaling game models a dynamic interaction between two agents who have differing access to information, in which a sender can choose truth-revelation, deception, or something between the two extremes. The addition in our model of a chance move following the sender's move models the possibility that, if the sender chooses deception, he will be detected. Deception could, in general, be applied by a defender or an adversary. Our design problem could then be either deception or anti-deception, depending on which side of the model our interest lies.
Attacker Incapable of Honeypot Detection
First, consider the case in which the attacker does not have the ability to detect honeypots, i.e. G honey . The parameters which determine the attacker and defender utilities are set according to Table 3 . The attacker's utility as a function of the fraction of normal systems in the network is given by the red (square) data points in Fig. 6 .2. We can distinguish two parameter regions. When the proportion of honeypots in the network is greater than approximately 40%, (i.e. p (0) < 60%), the defender is completely deterred from attacking. Because of the high likelihood that he will encounter a honeypot if he attacks, he chooses to withdraw from all systems. As the proportion of normal systems increases after p (0) > 60%, the receiver switches to attacking all systems. He attacks regardless of the sender's signal, because due to the sender's pooling signal, his signal does not convey any information about the type to the receiver. In this domain, as the proportion of normal systems increases, the expected utility of the receiver increases.
For this case in which the attacker cannot detect honeypots, the defender's expected utility as a function of p (0) is given by the red (square) data points in Fig. 6.1 . The sender's utility is perhaps slightly more interesting. We have noted that, in the domain p (0) < 60%, the sender never attacks. In this domain, it is actually beneficial for the sender to have as close as possible to the transition density of 60% normal systems, because he gains more utility from normal systems that are not attacked than from honeypots that are not attacked. But if the defender increases the proportion of normal systems beyond 60%, he incurs a sudden drop in utility, because the attacker switches form never attacking to always attacking. Thus, the if the defender has the capability to design his network with any number of honeypots, he faces an optimization in which he wants to have as many normal systems as possible, but in which he incurs a large penalty if he goes slightly over the limit 3 .
Attacker Capable of Honeypot Detection
Consider now how the network defense is affected if the attacker gains some ability to detect deception. The game now takes the form of G evidence honey
. Recall that in this form, a chance move has been added after the sender's action. The chance move determines whether the receiver observes evidence that the sender is being deceptive. For Fig. 6.1 and Fig. 6 .2, we have set the detection rates at = 0.8 and δ = 0.5. These fall within the attacker capability range R intermediate . Observing evidence does not guarantee deception; neither does a lack of evidence guarantee deception.
In the blue (diamond) data points in Fig. 6 .2, we see that, at the extremes of p (0), the utility of the attacker is unaffected by the ability to detect deception according to probabilities and δ. The low ranges of p (0), as described in table 4, correspond to the honeypot-saturated region. In this region, honeypots predominate to such an extent that the attacker is completely deterred from attacking. Note that, compared to the data points for the case without deception detection, the maximum proportion of normal systems which still incentivize the attacker to uniformly withdraw has decreased. Thus, for instance, p (0) of approximately 0.50 incentivizes an attacker without deception detection capabilities to withdraw from all systems, but does not incentivize an attacker with deception detection capabilities to withdraw. At p (0) = 0.50, the advent of honeypot-detection abilities causes the sender's utility to drop from 0.5 to approximately −2. At the other end of the p (0) axis, we see that a high-enough p (0) causes the utilities to again be unaffected by the ability to detect deception. This is because the proportion of normal systems is so high that the receiver's best strategy is to attack constantly (regardless of whether he observes evidence for deception).
In the middle (non-saturated) region of p (0), the attacker's strategy is no longer to solely attack or solely withdraw. This causes the "cutting the corner" behavior of the attacker's utility in Fig. 6.2 . This conditional strategy also induces the middle region for the defender's utility in Fig. 6 .1. Intuitively, we might expect that the attacker's ability to detect deception could only decrease the defender's utility. But the middle (non-saturated ) range of p (0) shows that this is not the case. Indeed for approximately p (0) = 0.6 to p (0) = 0.7, the defender actually benefits from the attacker's ability to detect deception! The attacker, himself, always benefits from the ability to detect deception. Thus, there is an interesting region of p (0) for which the ability of the attacker to detect deception results in a mutual benefit.
Overall, we see that the adversary's capability to detect deception has no effect on equilibrium utilities towards the extremes of p (0), but has an affect in the middle ranges of p (0). In order to completely deter an adversary from attacking systems in the network, the defender requires more honeypots (an increase from about 40% to about 50%). The ability to detect honeypots always increases the attacker's utility. Interestingly, there is both a region in which the defender suffers from the attacker's detection capability and a region in which the defender benefits from that detection capability.
Related Work
Deception has become a critical research area, and several works have studied problems similar to ours. Alcan et al. [17] discuss how to combine sensing technologies within a network with game theory in order to design intrusion detection systems. They study two models. The first is a cooperative game, in which the contribution of different sensors towards detecting an intrusion determines the coalitions of sensors whose threat values will be used in determining the threat level. In the second model, they include the attacker, who determines which subsystems to attack. This model is a dynamic information game, meaning that as moves place the game in various information sets, players learn about the history of moves. The game is thus an imperfect information game. Unlike our model, though, it is a complete information game, meaning that both players know the utility of the other player.
Farhang et al. study a multiple-period, information-assymetric attackerdefender game involving deception [18] . In their model, the sender type -benign or malicious -is known only with an initial probability to the receiver, and that probability is updated in a Bayesian manner during the course of multiple interactions. In [19] , Zhuang et al. also study deception in multiple-period signaling games, but their paper also involves resource-allocation. The paper has interesting incites into the advantage to a defender of maintaining secrecy. Similar to our work, they also consider an example of defensive use of deception. In their paper, however, the adversary learns about the defender only through repeated interactions, whereas in our paper the adversary implements a deception detection method.
We have drawn most extensively from the work of Carroll and Grosu [12] , who study the strategic use of honeypots for network defense in a signaling game. The parameters of our attacker and defender utilities come from [12] , and the basic structure of our signaling game is adapted from that work. In [12] , the type of a particular system is chosen randomly from the distribution of normal systems and honeypots. Then the sender chooses how to describe the system (as a normal system or as a honeypot), which may be truthful or deceptive. For the receiver's move, he may choose to attack, to withdraw, or to condition his attack on testing the system. In this way, honeypot detection is included in the model, but as an additional move to attacking or withdrawing which adds a cost to the attacker regardless of whether the system being tested is a normal system or a honeypot, but mitigates the cost of an attack being observed in the case that the system is a honeypot. In our paper, we enrich the representation of honeypot testing by assuming that it succeeds only with certain probability. We model the outcome of this testing as an additional move by nature after the sender's move. This models detection as technique which may not always succeed, and to which both the sender and receiver can adapt their equilibrium strategies.
Discussion
In this paper, we have investigated the ways in which the outcomes of a strategic, deceptive interaction are affected by the advent of deception-detecting technology. We studied this problem using two models: a cheap-talk signaling game with binary types, messages, and actions, and a version of a signaling game in which deception may be detected with some probability. We modeled the detection of deception as a chance move that occurs after the sender selects a message based on the type that he observes. For the first model, we gave the analytical equilibrium outcome, and for the second model, we presented numerical results. Throughout the paper, we used the example of honeypot implementation in network defense. In this context, the technology of detecting honeypots played the role of a malicious use of anti-deception. Using this illustrative example, we investigated a case study of network defense in which the adversary did and did not possess the ability to detect honeypots. This served as a general example to show how equilibrium utilities and strategies may change in games involving deception when the agent being deceived gains some ability to detect deception.
Our first contribution is the model we have presented for signaling games with deception detection. We also show how special cases of this model cause the game to degenerate into a traditional signaling game or into a complete information game. Our model is quite general, and could easily be applied to strategic interactions in interpersonal deception such as border control, international negotiation, advertising and sales, and suspect interviewing. Our second contribution is the numerical demonstration showing that pure-strategy equilibria fail to be supported under this model when the distribution of types is in a middle range but are supported when the distribution is close to either extreme. Finally, we show that it is possible that the ability of a receiver to detect deception could actually increase the utility of a possibly-deceptive sender. These results have concrete implications for network defense through honeypot deployment. More importantly, they are also general enough to apply to the large and critical body of strategic interactions that involve deception.
